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THE SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY RULE UNDER THE
JAPANESE NOVELTY STANDARD
Toshiko Takenaka*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under both Japanese and United States patent law, to obtain a
patent an invention must satisfy the requirements of "novelty" ' and
"nonobviousness." ' 2 Although the terms differ, it is commonly ac-
cepted that the novelty and inventive step requirements3 under Jap-
anese patent law correspond to the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements under United States patent law. 4 However, it has
been argued that the patentability standard is lower under Japanese
law than under American law; as a result, Japanese companies have
encroached on American inventions by obtaining patents for trivial
improvements. At least one American company has strongly op-
posed this practice in the Japanese patent system, emphasizing the
threat of Japanese competition.5
The patentability standard is closely related to a country's in-
dustrial and economic policies, and to the protection of pioneer in-
ventions and their improvements. In general, the patentability
standards of developing countries tend to be lower than those of
industrialized countries, so that improvements made by the domes-
* Ph.D. candidate, University of Washington. The author thanks Professor
Chisum, who suggested the Japanese novelty standard as a research topic and who gave
valuable assistance. The author also thanks Professor Henderson, Professor Monya,
Andrea Oakley, and Erik Utgaard for their helpful comments.
1. See generally CHISUM, PATENTS § 3.01 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter PATENTS] (to
fulfill the novelty requirement, a patentable invention must be new).
2. Id. § 5.01 (to fulfill the nonobvious requirement, a patentable invention "must
not have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter
of the invention pertains at the time of the invention and in light of the teachings of the
prior art.").
3. TOKKYO Ho (hereinafter PATENT CODE) Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29 (Japan).
The term "inventive step" is translated from the Japanese phrase shinpo sei.
4. 35 U.S.C §§ 101-103 (1988).
5. The president of Fusion Systems Corporation, Donald M. Spero, argued that
the Japanese Patent Office allows patents for trivial improvements so that Japanese
companies can freeze out American pioneer inventions. Spero, Patent Protection or
Piracy - A CEO Views Japan, HARV. Bus. REV. 58, 66 (Sept.-Oct. 1990).
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tic industries of developing countries can be better protected. In
most developing countries, since the owner of an invention is re-
quired to license patented improvements of that invention,6 protec-
tion can be inadequate if the patentability standard is too low; under
such circumstances, trivial modifications are patentable.
On the other hand, it is important to encourage innovation. A
lack of innovation discourages industrial progress. The inventor of
an improvement deserves a patent monopoly if the improvement
contributes to the progress of technology. Developments of new art
are always to some degree based on prior art. The real question is
what sort of improvements should be patentable.
It is commonly believed that the Japanese patentability stan-
dard is the same as the American standard, except for minor varia-
tions. Yet Japanese attorneys and examiners have never questioned
whether "new" means the same thing to them as it does to their
American counterparts. On the other hand, American attorneys
with extensive experience in handling Japanese patent applications
see differences between the novelty and inventive step standards of
Japanese patent law, and the novelty and nonobviousness standards
of American patent law. Some American patent attorneys suggest
that under Japanese patent law there seems to be yet another stan-
dard in addition to the novelty and inventive step standards. If so,
it is important for American attorneys to know the difference be-
tween Japanese and American standards so that they may overcome
rejections posed by Japanese patent examiners. Moreover, Japanese
attorneys often find it difficult to explain to foreign applicants the
reasons for rejections. Harmonizing patentability standards pro-
vides advantages to foreign applicants and attorneys as well as to
Japanese attorneys.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)7 has
been trying to harmonize patent laws in member countries, and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)8 recently started
to discuss the establishment of minimum standards in intellectual
property protection. In light of these movements, differences in the
6. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 92 (a patentee of improvements may request
the owner of the pioneer invention to hold consultations on the grant of a non-exclusive
license).
7. WIPO was established by multilateral convention in 1967. The organization
administers various intellectual property treaties, studies intellectual property laws, ren-
ders intellectual property law assistance, and proposes model laws and treaties. Con-
vention Establishing WIPO, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, U.N.T.S.
3.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted in 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (1969). The "GATT" is commonly
used to refer to both an international organization and to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, which is the organization's charter document.
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understanding of such basic terminology as "novelty" and "nonob-
viousness" cannot be ignored. To inventors whose patent applica-
tions are accepted in one country but rejected in another, the lack of
uniformity in patent laws may seem irrational. If in fact any differ-
ences between the novelty and inventive step standards of Japanese
patent law and the novelty and nonobviousness standards of Ameri-
can patent law exist, we must evaluate them to know their causes
and to make an effort to eliminate these differences in order to har-
monize Japanese patent law with the patent laws of other countries.
This article compares the novelty standard under Japanese pat-
ent law with the novelty standard under American patent law. This
article first explains the structure of the novelty and inventive step
provisions under Japanese patent law and examines the interpreta-
tion and basic legal theories of these provisions. The inventive step
standard developed out of the novelty standard. Thus, to under-
stand the inventive step standard, it is necessary to understand the
novelty standard.
Next, this article discusses the unique features of the Japanese
novelty standard. The strict novelty requirements of the patent
laws of the United States and European countries are contrasted
with the relaxed substantial identity rule developed by Japanese
courts, which will be discussed in detail. This article then evaluates
the differences between Japanese and other novelty standards, and
examines the reasons for those differences.
The final part of this article analyzes problems caused by the
substantial identity rule and questions whether this rule is in fact
necessary. The article concludes that the substantial identity rule
should be abolished in Japanese patent law, and that the novelty
and inventive step requirements should be clearly differentiated to
harmonize the Japanese patentability standard with American and
European standards, as well as to provide an objective patentability
standard for the Japanese patent system.
II. INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS AND GENERAL
THEORIES FOR JAPANESE NOVELTY AND
INVENTIVE STEP STANDARDS
A. Article 29: Novelty and Inventive Step
Japanese patent law, Article 29, Paragraph I defines the tradi-
tional novelty standard and Paragraph 2 defines the inventive step
standard, as follows:9
1. Any person who has made an invention which is industrially
9. PATENT CODE, supra note 3. This article also sets forth the requirement of
applicability. However, discussion in this paper will be limited to the novelty standard.
[Vol. 9:220
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applicable may obtain a patent therefor, except in the case of the
following inventions:
(1) inventions which were publicly known in Japan prior to
the filing of the patent application;
(2) inventions which were publicly used in Japan prior to
the filing of the patent application;
(3) inventions which were described in a publication distrib-
uted in Japan or elsewhere prior to the filing of the patent
application.
2. Where an invention could easily have been made, prior to
the filing of the patent application, by a person with ordinary
skill in the art to which the invention pertains, on the basis of an
invention or inventions referred to in any of the paragraphs of
subsection 1, a patent shall not be granted for such an invention
notwithstanding subsection 1.
1. Novelty standard
Novelty is a basic requirement to justify a legal monopoly. The
novelty standard has existed since the beginning of the patent sys-
tem. The origin of the novelty standard is found in Darcy v. Allin,10
an English case which became the foundation for patent systems in
common law countries. I The rationale for requiring that an inven-
tion be "new" to be patentable is common to all patent systems,
including those of the United States and Japan. The rationale for
requiring that an invention be "new" to be patentable is clear: it is
unreasonable to allow a person to enjoy a monopoly over part of an
industry which was already in existence. Since the purpose of the
patent system is to encourage the progress of industry, science and
the useful arts, 12 allowing a monopoly on existing technology
would debilitate industry and forestall progress by preventing peo-
ple from freely using technology.
On the surface, the Japanese novelty standard is very similar to
the American standard. An invention satisfies the novelty standard
when the invention is "new"; that is, when it is not identical to a
10. 74 E.R. 1131 (1602) (a patent monopoly was granted to existing playing cards.
The patent granting to Mr. Darcy a monopoly on the selling, manufacturing, and im-
porting of playing cards was held invalid:
Now therefore I will show you how the judges have heretofore allowed of
monopoly patents which is that where any man by his own charge and
industry or by his own wit or invention both bring any new trade into the
Realm or any Engine tending to the furtherance of a trade that never was
used before and that for the good of the Realm; in such cases the King
may grant to him a monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until the
subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth
bring by his Invention to the common wealth, otherwise not.)
11. With respect to the case development of standards of patentability in the
United States and United Kingdom, see generally, Bochnovic, The Inventive Step, 5
I.C.C. STUDIES (1982).
12. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, 1 U.S.C.A.
§ 673 (1987).
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prior art invention listed in art. 29, para. 1, items 1-3. Because the
Japanese patent system is based on the first-to-file rule,' 3 prior art
consists of those inventions which are made public prior to the date
of the filing of the application 14 rather than the date of invention. I5
There are three types of prior art in Japanese patent law: publicly
known inventions,' 6 publicly used inventions, 17 and published in-
ventions.18 In some respects, the unpatentable inventions listed in
art. 29, para. 1, substantially correspond to the bar events provided
in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) to (d).19 In both Japan and the United States,
inventions described in a publication in any country constitute prior
art.20 Under Japanese patent law, inventions publicly used or
known do not constitute prior art unless they are used or known in
Japan. In addition, there is no bar event equivalent to the "on sale"
bar provided in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b).21 An invention which would
have been rejected as unpatentable for lack of novelty in the United
States because of the "on sale" bar does not lose its novelty under
Japanese patent law unless the invention is disclosed to persons who
have no obligation to keep the invention secret.
There are certain exceptions to the Japanese rules regarding
public disclosure which provide a grace period to the inventor. 22
For instance, an inventor may experiment and publish his results or
he may provide a written report of his invention at a meeting of an
academic society without losing his novelty claim. 23 Where novelty
is lost contrary to the will of the inventor, as in an unauthorized
publication, the inventor may obtain a patent if he files an applica-
tion within six months of the date on which the invention lost its
novelty.24 In some circumstances, public display of an article which
embodies the invention may not entail loss of novelty if the inventor
13. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art 39 (para. 1 provides that where two or more
patent applications relating to the same invention are filed on different dates, only the
first application may obtain a patent for the invention).
14. Or the priority date if the application is first filed outside Japan.
15. Compare with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (American patent law is based on the
first-to-invent system); See PATENTS, supra note 1, § 6.02.
16. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 29, para. 1, item 1.
17. Id., item 2.
18. Id., item 3.
19.. See generally CHISUM, ELEMENTS OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW, § 1500
[hereinafter ELEMENTS]. Bar events mean conditions that will preclude a patent.
20. However, in the United States, there is a one year grace period if the invention
is described by the inventor in a publication.
21. See generally ELEMENTS, supra note 19, § 1522.
22. Id., § 1520. The grace period is from the critical date, which is one year prior
to the filing date. Under United States patent law, an inventor is given a one-year grace
period so that he or she can prepare and file an application within one year from a
public disclosure or commercial use of the invention.
23. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 30, para. 1.
24. Id., art 30, para 2.
[Vol. 9:220
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files an application within six months of the display. 25 However,
the Japanese patent office applies these exceptions strictly. More-
over, they are applied only to the novelty standard, not to the first-
to-file rule provided in Article 39.26 If an inventor who is entitled to
an exception files for a patent after a second inventor has filed for
the same invention, then neither can obtain a patent. The second
inventor is barred by the disclosure of the first inventor, and the first
inventor is barred by the first-to-file rule.
2. Inventive Step
As the policies of the patent system changed and technology
progressed, a new standard developed, which requires more than
mere novelty. 27 A fundamental principle common to patent sys-
tems that underlies both the Japanese inventive step standard and
the American nonobviousness standard28 is the need to balance
public interest considerations against the grant of a patent monop-
oly. 29 A patent monopoly is not justified by trivial change or modi-
fication. 30 The indiscriminate protection of inventions which would
naturally occur to any person skilled in the art would tend to ob-
struct rather than stimulate inventiveness. 3'
Historically, the patent systems of the United States and Ger-
many have had two tests for this new standard. One is the nonobvi-
ousness test and the other is the advance test, also known as the new
result test.32 Under the nonobviousness test, an invention is ex-
amined in terms of its physical and operational structure to deter-
mine whether one skilled in the art could easily have conceived of
the improvement over the existing art. Furthermore, prior art pub-
lications are evaluated to determine whether the improvement
25. Id., art 30, para 3.
26. See supra note 11.
27. With respect to the history of inventive novelty, see generally, Kitch, Graham
v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, Sup. CT. REV. 293 (1966) [hereinafter
Kitch]; see also PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.02; Seidal, The Constitution and a Standard
of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'V 5 (1966).
28. The first Japanese Patent Act, Senbai Ryaku Kisoku (The Regulation of Patent
Monopoly), Law No. 175 of 1871, art. 1, provided: Where with respect to machinery,
tools and instruments, weapons, textiles, etc. a new invention which has not yet been
open to the public in this country is made and the invention is capable of advancing the
convenience of the people, an inventor is entitled to a patent monopoly for a limited
period.
29. See generally Bochnovic, supra note 11. With respect to the history of inven-
tive novelty, see also Kitch, supra note 27; PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.02.
30. See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 1, 1912, Daishin'in (Great Court of Judicature),
Japan, 786 Horitsu Shimbun 15 [hereinafter Judgment of Apr. 1, 1912].
31. This principle was originally developed by American courts before the first Jap-
anese patent law was drafted. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248
(1850).
32. See generally 1 ULLRICH, STANDARDS OF PATENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN IN-
VENTIONS (1977) [hereinafter ULLRICH].
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could easily be conceived by combining the publications. Under the
advance test, an invention is compared to the prior art to determine
whether the new invention has an advantage over the prior art.
Thus, the advance test always compares a new invention to the
prior art to evaluate relative advantage.
There had been no statutory requirement in Japanese patent
law until 1959. 33 However, even in the early stages of the Japanese
patent system, there was the principle that a patent could not be
granted for a trivial invention. This resembled American law,
where American courts had long recognized the nonobviousness
standard, but the standard was not codified until 1952. As Japanese
patent law is largely based on American patent law,34 Japanese
courts naturally followed the principles developed in the American
courts. So even though the only statutory requirement of Japanese
patent law was novelty,"3 the courts developed the inventive step
requirement as a result of the influence of the American nonobvi-
ousness test as well as the German advance test. 36
The revision of the Patent Law in 1959 was one of the most
significant changes in the history of the Japanese patent system.
The Diet for the first time recognized the judicially-developed in-
ventive step doctrine and added the inventive step standard in arti-
cle 29, paragraph 2. According to this standard, the differences
between an invention in issue and prior art inventions are examined
not to decide whether the invention in issue has an advantage over
the prior art, but to decide whether one skilled in the art would
have readily conceived of the improvement by the filing date. Thus,
the Diet chose the American standard of nonobviousness over the
German advance test.
The postwar technology boom prompted this revision. Since
the 1950s, Japanese industries and technologies have progressed
dramatically. This technological progress has been reflected in an
increased number of patent applications. The old patentability
standard became outdated and was consequently changed by case
law. After World War II, industrialized countries revised their pat-
33. See PATENT CODE, supra note 3.
34. The first Japanese patent law was based on the American patent system. Dur-
ing the Taisho period, the German influence on Japanese law became stronger. The
Taisho ho, the basis of the Patent Code, adopted most of the significant features of the
German patent system.
35. Judgment of Apr. 1, 1912, supra note 30. This case involved a well-known rice-
cleaning machine, to which inventor added a spiral rotating fan that had been used for
other machines. The Patent Bureau refused the application on the ground of lack of
novelty because the claimed invention was a combination of old elements.
36. Takenaka, Clear Standards of Patentability for the Japanese System, in LES-
SONS FROM THE EVOLUTION OF PATENTABILITY STANDARDS IN GERMANY AND THE
UNITED STATES (1990) [hereinafter Takenaka].
[Vol. 9:220
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ent laws. German patent law, a model for the Japanese patent sys-
tem, was also revised, triggering the revision of Japanese patent law.
Although the revisions of 1959 introduced many new and im-
portant concepts, there has been little discussion of the objectives
and intentions of the revisions. 37 Prior to 1959, inventions were re-
jected on the ground of lack of novelty if they were identical to
prior art inventions or were trivial modifications of prior art inven-
tions. Because Japanese patent law did not clarify the relationship
of the new inventive step standard to the novelty standard, it was
not clear whether the introduction of the inventive step standard
would affect the novelty standard.38
Once the inventive step standard was introduced, the Japanese
courts and patent office should have stopped basing rejections of
inventions which involved trivial modifications on lack of novelty.
However, they were reluctant to do so because they were worried
that using only one standard to reject trivial modifications would
lower the patentability standard. 39 Thus, they did not seriously dis-
cuss changing the practice of rejection based on lack of novelty, and
no significant change occurred after the introduction of the inven-
tive step standard.
Further, it was believed that the Diet had recognized and codi-
fied the judicially-developed inventive step standard. However, it
was not clear how the statutory language should have effected the
judicially developed inventive step standard, and there was ex-
tended debate on the relationship between the new statutory lan-
guage and the counterpart patent laws of foreign countries.4°
Scholars and practitioners were naturally confused and could not
reach a clear consensus.41 By the time of the revisions, Japanese
courts had already established their own inventive step requirement,
a mixture of the American nonobviousness standard and the Ger-
man advance test. The Japanese inventive step standard was unique
at the time of the revisions, with no counterpart in Germany or the
United States.
37. See generally N. Sugibayashi, Shin kogyo Shoyuken Gairon (New Treatise for
Industrial Property Law), HATSUMEI (INVENTION) (1962); S. MATSUMOTO, TOKKYO
HATSUMEI NO HoGoHANI (THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR PATENTED INVENTION)
(1981).
38. See generally UCHIDA, HATSUMEI 1 (INVENTION) (1969). This book contains
the proceedings of a patent law seminar where leading scholars and practitioners of the
1960s met to discuss the effects of the revision.
39. Id. at 82. One leading legal writer, who is a former chief examiner of the Pat-
ent Office, dared to state that the introduction of the inventive step standard in a statu-
tory form would be meaningless if this caused the novelty standard to be lowered. He
apparently was concerned that some inventions which would have been rejected for lack
of novelty before the revision would escape rejection if examined only under the inven-
tive step standard. See also Takenaka, supra note 36.
40. UCHIDA, supra note 38, at 66.
41. Takenaka, supra note 36, at 54.
1991]
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American and German scholars recognized that the nonobvi-
ousness test and the advance test were different. Both countries
evaluated these tests and chose the nonobviousness test as the
proper standard.42 In Japan, these tests had become inseparable in
the patent system. Yet an American or German scholar who had
read article 29, paragraph 2 would have understood that the Japa-
nese Diet chose the nonbviousness standard over the advance test.
Japanese courts and scholars did not see this because the Japanese
patent system had never clearly distinguished the two tests. Thus,
they did not completely discard the advance test, as they continued
to use the inventive step standard, a combination of the nonobvious-
ness test and the advance test.
B. Article 29 bis : The Novelty Standard with Respect to
Unpublished Prior Art Pending to Japanese
Patent Office
Even though an invention does not fall under the exceptions
listed in article 29, paragraph 1, items 1 - 3, it is not patentable if it
has been disclosed in an application pending to the Japanese Patent
Office (JPO) that was filed prior to the application of the inven-
tion. 43 Article 29, paragraph 1 provides that where an invention
claimed in a patent application is identical to an invention disclosed
in the specifications or drawings of an earlier application, and where
the laying open for public inspection" or the publication after the
examination 45 were effected after the filing of the patent application,
a patent shall not be granted for that invention.
The requirement that the invention is not disclosed in an ear-
lier, co-pending application means that a patentee must be the one
who first discloses the invention. When the claims in an application
are identical to the claims disclosed in an earlier, co-pending appli-
cation, the invention is not novel. 46 Even though the earlier appli-
cation was not published or publicly known, the invention had been
42. See Kitch, supra note 27; see also ULLRICH, supra note 32.
43. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 29, para. 1.
44. Id., art. 65. Under Japanese patent law, all pending patent applications are laid
open for public inspection 18 months after the date of filing, except for applications
which have already been published. This publication is called kokai.
45. Id., art. 51. Where the examiner finds no reason for refusing a patent applica-
tion, the application is published. Any person may file an opposition against the grant
of a patent for the application within three months of the publication. This publication
is called kokoku.
46. The Japanese Patent Office reviews both claims and specifications in a patent
application. This review is similar to that practiced in Europe. For a discussion of the
European "whole contents" doctrine, see, Decision of Jan. 20, 1987, T167/84, Techni-
cal Board of Appeals, European Patent Office (The "whole contents" of an older docu-
ment within the meaning of Article 54(3) EPC do not comprise features which are
equivalents to the features according to the document).
[Vol. 9:220
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disclosed to the JPO when the earlier application was filed.4 7 At
any rate, an invention will be published later than will the earlier
application made by another, so this does not benefit industry.
The novelty standard provided in article 29 bis corresponds to
the requirements provided in 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) that bar a patent
when the invention has been described in a United States patent
granted on an application filed by another before the applicant's
date of invention.48 The rationale for § 102(e) is that the patentee
must be the first inventor; thus, it is similar to that of article 29 bis.
Section 102(e) and article 29 bis do not apply to inventions made by
the same inventor nor to an invention made by the same
applicant.4 9
American and Japanese patent laws differ somewhat. Under
American patent law, an application is kept secret until a patent is
granted. If no patent is granted, the contents of an application are
not published.50 Thus, an application constitutes § 102(e) prior art
only if a patent is granted and published.
Another major difference between Art. 29 bis and § 102(e) is
that § 102(e) provides that "prior art" may be applied not only to
the inventive step standard but also to the nonobviousness stan-
dard. 51 In contrast, under Japanese patent law, an invention is un-
patentable only if it is identical to inventions disclosed in a co-
pending application. 52 Thus, the prior art inventions provided in
article 29 bis apply only to the novelty standard.
III. FEATURES OF THE JAPANESE NOVELTY
STANDARD
Before remarking on the features of the Japanese novelty and
inventive step standards, it may be useful to review basic novelty
requirements under United States patent law and the European Pat-
ent Convention. Accordingly, the following sections briefly discuss
the rules used in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and American courts, the rules used in the European Pat-
ent Office (EPO) with respect to the novelty standard, and then the
47. See generally YOSHIFuJI, TOKKYOHO GAISETSU (OUTLINE OF PATENT LAW)
159 (1988).
48. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926). Sec-
tion 102(e) codified the Milburn doctrine.
49. ELEMENTS, supra note 19, § 1550.
50. Under Japanese patent law, all applications are published 18 months from the
filing dates. See Takenaka, supra note 36. Accordingly, applications constitute prior
art as provided in article 29 except for applications which were abandoned before they
were published.
51. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 147 U.S.P.Q. 429 (1965).
See generally ELEMENTS, supra note 19, § 1550, n.217 (1987).
52. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 29, para. 1.
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rule requiring novelty of an invention as used in the Japanese Patent
Office (JPO) and Japanese courts.
A. The American Novelty Standard: The Single Source/
Identity Rule
United States patent law defines the novelty requirement as
follows:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, sub-
ject to the conditions and requirements of this title.53
Thus, § 101 requires that a patentable invention be "new".
§ 102 provides the conditions of novelty. Under United States pat-
ent law, the separation of the novelty and nonobviousness standards
is rather clear. The single source/identity rule, which is commonly
accepted by American courts and scholars, requires that only inven-
tions which are identical to prior art inventions can be rejected for
lack of novelty. An invention involving any sort of modification
must be examined by the nonobviousness standard.
Under the single/source identity rule, the standard for lack of
novelty is one of strict identity.5 4 A single prior source must con-
tain every essential element of a claimed invention to constitute an-
ticipation.5" Anticipation is the failure of the invention to meet the
patent law requirement of novelty.56
Anticipation cannot be shown by combining more than one
reference to show the elements of the claimed invention. If it is
necessary to rely on a second prior art to find all elements of the
claim, then the combination of those references may constitute
proof of nonobviousness under § 103, but it will not constitute an-
ticipation under § 102. 57 The distinction between the novelty stan-
dard and the nonobviousness standard is clear to American
courts.58 Because of the strict requirement that all elements of the
53. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
54. See generally PATENTS, supra note 1, § 3.02. See also Mintz & Rachine, Antici-
pation and Obviousness in the Federal Circuit, 13 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 195, 195-98 (1985)
[hereinafter Mintz & Rachine].
55. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 534, 226 U.S.P.Q. 619, 621 (1985) ("It is ele-
mentary that an anticipation rejection requires a showing that each limitation of a claim
must be found in a single reference, practice or device.").
56. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness: An Eternal Golden Braid,
15 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 57 (1987).
57. Rose, Ascertaining Differences - When Is The "Invention Not Identically Dis-
closed or Described?", in NON OBVIOUSNESS - THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENT-
ABILITY 116 (Witherspoon ed. 1978).
58. Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Industrial Products, Inc., 756 F.2d 1556, 1560
(1985), reprinted in KITCH, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROcESS 876,
878 (1989). The following particular words of the Jamesbury court illustrate the dis-
tinction between the novelty and nonobviousness standards:
[Vol. 9:220
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claimed invention must be present within a single prior art refer-
ence, the requisite degree of identity is rarely found and anticipation
is deemed a "technical defense." 59 The result under the novelty
standard is more predictable than that under the nonobviousness
standard. In this sense it is more objective. Furthermore, a claim
of invention can be carefully defined so as to avoid anticipation, but
not obviousness. Also, examiners are on more secure ground when
they reject an application for lack of novelty rather than failure to
meet the requirement of nonobviousness, in the sense that they need
not prove the level of ordinary skill in the art nor the analogous
nature of combining prior art, nor need they evaluate the differences
between the claimed invention and prior art, and so-called secon-
dary considerations. 6°
However, some courts seem to use a more relaxed standard,
applying the rule that minor or obvious modifications cannot avoid
anticipation.6' The number of such courts is far smaller than that
of the majority, which use the stricter novelty rule. Further, most
of the cases which used the relaxed rule somehow relate to the issue
of ascertaining the content of disclosure.62 In other words, in these
cases the content of disclosure was interpreted expansively to in-
clude an element which was in fact missing from the disclosure. In
The instruction... to the effect that the claims are invalid if the prior art
Saunders patent discloses "substantially the same things" as claims 7 and
8, and Interrogatory No. 1, which speaks of the claims not differing in
"significant particulars," are not legally correct.
The error in this interpretation of the statutory requirement of nov-
elty is the same as that which was addressed in Connell [v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548, 220 U.S.P.Q. 193, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1983)]:
The opinion says anticipation may be shown by less than "complete
anticipation" if one of ordinary skill may in reliance on the prior art
"complete the work required for the invention," and that "it is suffi-
cient for anticipation" if the general aspects are the same and the
difference in minor matters is only such as would suggest itself to
one of ordinary skill in the art. Those statements relate to obvi-
ousness, or anticipation. Anticipation requires the presence in a sin-
gle prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention
arranged as in the claim (citations omitted). A prior art disclosure
that "almost" meets that standard may render the claim invalid
under § 103; it does not "anticipate."
Here, as well, anticipation is not shown by a prior art discloure which is
only "substantially the same" as the claimed invention.
59. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
1065 (D. Del. 1987).
60. Regarding the test of nonobviousness, see generally, PATENTS, supra note 1,
§ 5.04 ("Secondary considerations" are nontechnological considerations which are rele-
vant to the issue of the nonobviousness of an invention).
61. RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 211 U.S.P.Q.
385 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Kasiwa, J. dissenting). See generally Mints & Rachine, supra note
54.
62. Eg., Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734, 220 U.S.P.Q. 845
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (Judge Nies, dissenting from the majority opinion, stated that to be
anticipatory, a reference need not expressly disclose what is inherent).
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these cases courts decided that the invention was disclosed in the
prior art even though an element of the invention was missing.
The number of courts relying on the relaxed rule is insignifi-
cant. In general, the American courts' view with respect to the rule
requiring novelty can be considered the single source/identity rule.
B. European Patent Convention: Single Source/Identity Rule
Today, most European countries are members of the European
Patent Convention (EPC).63 Member states of the EPC have har-
monized their national patent laws. Under the EPC, domestic and
European applications and patents for any member country should
have the same effect on each other, though it has been left to the
countries' national legislatures to determine how these principles
for European patents become part of national law. 64 As for the
Federal Republic of Germany, the EPC provision has been included
in the Law on International Patent Treaty (December 16, 1976).
Worldwide harmonization has been discussed mainly by the
European, United States, and Japanese patent offices. A study of
the novelty standard based on the text of the EPC and the EPC's
Examination Guideline is very important for harmonization, con-
sidering that European countries have been successful in harmoniz-
ing differences among member countries' patent laws, including
German patent law, which was a model for the present Japanese
patent law, and United Kingdom patent law, which is similar to
American patent law.
The EPC defines the standards of patentability as follows:
European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which
involve an inventive step.
With regard to novelty, the EPC further provides that the nov-
elty standard is satisfied if an invention does not form part of the
state of the art.65 The state of the art is defined as including every-
thing made available for public use by means of a written or oral
description, by use or in any other way, 66 before the date of filing of
the European patent application or a validly claimed convention
priority date.67
Similar to the novelty standard of American law, if an applica-
tion is to be rejected for lack of novelty, it is necessary that a single
63. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973 [hereinafter EPC],
art. 52(1).
64. See generally Cornish, The Essential Criteria for Patentability of European In-
ventions: Novelty and Inventive Step, 14 I.C.C. STUDIES 765 (1983).
65. EPC, supra note 63, art. 54(1).
66. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 29, paras. 1 and 2.
67. Id., art. 54(2).
[Vol. 9:220
SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY RULE
document disclose that which is claimed. The EPC guideline68
provides:
It should be noted that in considering novelty (as distinct from
inventive step), it is not permissible to combine separate items of
prior art together.69
...Novelty and inventive step are different criteria. Novelty
exists if there is any difference between the invention and the
known art.70
In considering whether there is inventive step (as distinct from
novelty), it is permissible to combine together the disclosures of
two or more documents or parts of documents, different parts of
the same document or other pieces of prior art. .... 71
Thus, the EPC uses the single source/identity rule. Further,
the Technical Board of Appeals of the European Patent Office has
held it improper to read different portions of the same document
together when it was not clear that they were intended to be read
together.72 Where one document explicitly refers to another docu-
ment, it is considered proper to read those documents together.73
Of course, a mere difference in expression used to describe an inven-
tion does not avoid anticipation. 74 In short, the EPC uses a strict
rule for deciding novelty, and their practice is substantially the
same as that under American law.
C. Japanese Law: Substantial Identity Rule
Interpreted literally, the Japanese novelty standard requires
that a patentable invention be "new" and nothing more, similar to
the novelty standards under American law and the EPC.75 How-
ever, the meaning of "new" developed by Japanese courts seems to
be different from that of the United States and the EPC. The deter-
mination of novelty has always involved not only factual decisions
but also a legal evaluation: the concept - that is, the technical idea
- of an invention described in a claim is evaluated along with the
concept of prior art, rather than the language describing the
claimed invention with the language of prior art.76 Thus, it is natu-
68. European Patent Office Guidelines, in SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW &
PRACTICE (1985).
69. Id., pt. C, ch. IV, para. 7, at 7.1.
70. Id., para. 9, at 9.1.
71. Id. at 9.7.
72. Bayer v. Titanly Sulphate, T183/184, 1986 E.P.O.R. 174.
73. Decision of Dec. 1986 (Alternative Claims v. Amoco Corp.), T153/85, 1988
E.P.O.J. 1.
74. Decision of Oct. 29, 1986 (Foam Plastic Filter v. Eriksson), T114/86, 1987
E.P.O.J. 485.
75. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 29, para. 1.
76. See generally NAKAYAMA, CHUKAI TOKKYO Ho (DETAILED EXPLANATION
OF THE PATENT LAW) 313 (1983) (since the identity of invention must be decided by
the identity of technical idea, two inventions are not necessarily different when the
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ral that courts did not feel bound by the language of the claim and
adopted the substantial identity rule, under which a claim is re-
jected for lack of novelty whenever the inventive concept, rather
than the claim language, corresponds to that of prior art inventions.
The substantial identity rule is similar to the single source/
identity rule because it also involves a determination of whether an
invention is identical to another invention disclosed in a single prior
art.77 However, the Japanese substantial identity rule is a more re-
laxed standard than the American and EPC novelty standards since
every element in a claim need not necessarily be found in a single
prior art. That is to say, an invention is anticipated even if some of
its elements are missing from prior art as long as the addition or
change of the elements is considered minor or obvious to one skilled
in the art.
In 1966, the Japanese Patent Office published its examination
guidelines relating to the test examining whether two inventions are
identical. 78 Since then, though there have been several revisions of
the patent law, the principle whereby it is determined whether two
inventions are identical has remained substantially the same. The
principle is: Where invention A is substantially the same as inven-
tion B, these inventions are identical. 79
The guideline provides five types of examples of inventions
which are considered identical:
1. Inventions whose structures, objects and advantages are the
same.
2. Inventions whose structures are the same, but the descrip-
tion of their objects and advantages is different. In this case, the
objects and advantages are recognized by the inventor differently.
However, it is clear in fact that the objects and advantages must
be the same as long as their structures are the same. Thus, these
types of inventions are essentially the same as the inventions clas-
sified under item 1.
3. Inventions which are considered substantially the same.
(a) Inventions whose structures are different, but the differ-
claim language or elements described in claims are different); TAKEDA, TOKKYO
SHINKETU TORIKESHI SOSHO TONO JITSUMU (PRACTICE IN TRIAL AGAINST EXAM-
INER'S DECISION OF REFUSAL) 137 (1988) (an invention is a creation of technical idea
by which a law of nature is utilized; the identity of inventions means the identity of
technical idea).
77. Takeda, Hatsumei no Jisshitsuteki Doitsusei ni tsuite (The Substantial Identity
of Invention), 86 HATSUMEI (INVENTION) 171 (1989) [hereinafter Takeda); Hayashi,
Hatsumei no Doitsusei o megutte (Comment on the Substantial Identity of Invention), 38
TOKKYO KANRI (PATENT MANAGEMENT) 931 (1988).
78. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, HATUMEI NO DOITSUSEI NI KANSURU SHINSA
KuUN (GUIDELINES RELATING TO THE IDENTITY OF INVENTION) [hereinafter JPO
GUIDELINES] (Apr. 1978); See also YOSHIMINE, SHINSA KUUN NO KAISETSU (EXPLA-
NATION OF THE EXAMINATION GUIDELINE) 115-50 (1986) [hereinafter YOSHIMINE].
79. JPO GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at [1]-14-7; YOSHIFUJI, TOKKYOHO
GAISETSU (OUTLINE OF THE PATENT LAW) 91, 151 (1988).
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ence is a simple modification which one skilled in the art
could have naturally conceived of and the difference does
not result in any significant difference in objects and advan-
tages of the inventions. Simple modifications include 1)
changing one old element to another; 2) combining or omit-
ting one or more parts of an old device or process; 3) substi-
tuting one material for another; 4) substituting an equivalent
for an element of old device or process; 5) changing or limit-
ing the shape, degree or arrangement of an old device or
process without resulting in any significant advantage; and
6) limiting or changing the value of elements of an old thing
or process without resulting in any significant advantage.
(b) Inventions one of which is considered a mere new use of
the other invention.
(c) Inventions whose difference in structure relate to a mod-
ification which is obvious to one skilled in the art, or relate
to meaningless limitations or conditions.
(d) Inventions one of which relates to the genus of another
invention, and the latter invention could have been consid-
ered a species of the former invention based on the state of
art at the time of application.
4. Inventions involving only a difference such that includes an
alternative limitation, and the other includes one of the alterna-
tive limitations.
5. Inventions, one of which is a combination of the other inven-
tion and an old invention, and the addition of old invention is
considered meaningless.
Among the above five types of identical inventions, only inven-
tions which fall under items 1 and 2 are considered identical under
the strict single source/identity rule of American law and the EPC.
The important questions are how inventions falling under items 3, 4
and 5 are examined under American law and why they are ex-
amined under the novelty standard under Japanese patent law.
Thus, it is useful to examine the nature of these inventions to see
whether they are in fact inventions which lack novelty.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY RULE
A. Simple Modifications - Example 3(a)
Japanese courts often use the phrases "a simple workmanship
modification" or "a simple change or addition of old elements or
steps to prior art" to find a substantial identity of inventions.80
These phrases originate from the Yamaguchi case, a 1961 Tokyo
High Court decision.8 ' In Atomeru Corporation v. Commissioner of
80. Takeda, Tokkyo Shinketu Torikeshi Sosho no Shomondai (Problems relating to
Law Suits Reversing the Decisions of the Patent Office), 37 TOKKYO KANRI 1194 (1987).
81. Judgment of Sept. 27, 1954, Tokyo Kosai (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 12 Gyo-
sei Reishu 1060 (the court explained "workmanship modification" as follows:
Usually, a modification is to conceive a concrete means which achieves an
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Patent Office,82 for example, an applicant appealed the JPO's rejec-
tion of its patent application for a thermal deposition device for
manufacturing a semiconductor wafer. The Tokyo High Court rec-
ognized the structural difference between the invention at issue and
a prior art invention: in the claimed invention the pressure in the
reactor chamber was kept lower than the pressure in the high pres-
sure chamber, while the pressure in the reactor chamber of the cited
invention was kept slightly higher than the pressure in the high
pressure chamber. However, the court considered the structural
difference insignificant, deciding that any difference in effect was not
provided by the structural difference with respect to the purpose of
the invention, that is, to prevent the chambers from blowing out as
a result of the great difference in pressure of both chambers. Thus,
the court affirmed the JPO's rejection of the application, holding
that the difference was a simple modification which one skilled in
the art would have readily adopted to achieve the objective desired.
In another recent case,83 the court reasoned along similar lines
to find a simple modification. An applicant's invention related to a
method for constructing a pile foundation. In the claimed inven-
tion, a hole for the bulb-shaped portion of the pile is bored with a
twisted drill rather than an auger head drill. The court recognized
the structural difference, but concluded the difference was a simple
modification that did not provide any significant advantage.
However, it is doubtful that these differences should have been
examined under the novelty standard. The proper measure to eval-
uate the difference between a claimed invention and a cited inven-
tion is the inventive step standard.
Surprisingly, the step of examining the novelty of an invention
found in the recent Japanese cases corresponds to one of the steps
which American courts once used to strike down an invention in-
volving only a trivial modification under the novelty standard.
Before the nonobviousness standard was statutorily adopted, Amer-
ican courts developed the concept of inventive novelty and used
negative rules 4 to reject applications which involved insignificant
modifications. The nonobviousness test was one of the judicially de-
veloped negative rules; when § 103 was introduced, it was based on
object which has been in existence. Regarding a patent, one can achieve
such an object by using old means prior art, substituting new material
with that of prior art, or using a well-known design or process for new
use. This type of modification is a mere workshop modification, and thus
does not constitute an invention.)
82. Judgment of Feb. 23, 1989, Tokyo Kosai (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 244 Tok-
kyo to Kigyo 33.
83. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1986, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 1986
Hanketsu Torikeshishu 248.
84. WALKER, PATENTS (2d ed. 1889), cited in PATENTS, supra note 1 [hereinafter
WALKER].
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this test. Under the nonobviousness test, the difference between two
inventions was regarded as a simple modification or the work of
mechanical skill if the difference was obvious to one skilled in the
art and would have been adopted by one skilled to achieve the de-
sired objective of the modification.85 When an invention involved
only a simple modification, American courts and the patent office
found lack of novelty. However, American courts no longer evalu-
ate simple modifications under the novelty standard. They evaluate
any form of modification under the nonobviousness standard.
Examples of simple modifications provided in the JPO guide-
lines8 6 substantially correspond to some of the negative rules. This
shows that Japanese courts still use judicially developed rules that
should have been transformed into subtests of the inventive step
standard when the statutory form of the inventive step standard was
introduced into Japanese patent law.
The negative rules, that is, the list of modifications which did
not constitute invention, are recited by Walker's treatise:8 7
It is not invention:
(1) to produce an article which differs from some older
thing only in excellence of workmanship;
(2) to substitute superior for inferior materials, in making
one or more or all of the parts of a thing;
(3) to so enlarge and strengthen a machine that it will oper-
ate on larger materials than before;
(4) to change the degree of a thing or of one feature of a
thing;
(5) to produce an 'aggregation;'
(6) to duplicate one or more of the parts of a machine;
(7) to omit one or more of the parts of an existing thing,
unless that omission causes a new mode of operation of the
parts retained;
(8) to improve a known structure by substituting an
equivalent for either of its parts;
(9) to combine old devices into a new article without pro-
ducing any new mode of operation;
(10) to use an old thing or process for a new purpose;
(11) to reverse parts, combine two parts into one, or divide
one part into two.
Referring again to the list of modifications in the JPO guide-
lines,8 8 the modification listed in (1) corresponds to the definition of
85. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850) ("[U]nless more
ingenuity and skill... were required... than were possessed by an originality mechanic
acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity
which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improve-
ment is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.").
86. JPO GUIDELINES, supra note 78.
87. WALKER, supra note 84, at 26-36, cited in PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.04[5].
88. See JPO GUIDELINES, supra note 78.
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workmanship modification Japanese courts often use. The modifi-
cation listed in (2) corresponds to example 3.(a) 3) of the guidelines.
The modifications listed in (3), (4), (6), and (7) substantially corre-
spond to the example 3.(a) 5) of the guidelines. The modification
listed in (8) corresponds to example 3.(a) 4) of the guidelines. As
for the other examples in the guidelines, example 3.(a) 6) corre-
sponds to one commentator's statement that "there is ordinarily no
invention in changing the proportions of the ingredients of a well-
known composition, or the amount of the reagents used in a well-
known chemical process."8 9
Even though most of these negative rules of invention function
as inferences in the determination of nonobviousness, when § 103
was introduced, American courts discarded all these rules to
achieve uniform results of patentability. However, these rules sur-
vived under Japanese patent law as subtests for the novelty stan-
dard, even after the introduction of Article. 29, Paragraph 2.
Furthermore, after recognizing a structural difference between
the claimed invention and a prior art invention, Japanese courts
tend to evaluate this difference based on the advantage of the differ-
ence. 90 A similar test evaluating an invention based on its advan-
tage over prior art can be found in the history of the development of
the German inventive step standard.91 However, as American
courts discarded all tests other than the nonobviousness test, Ger-
man courts also discarded the so-called "advance test" because of
its inability to reject trivial modifications. When they tried to find
an objective standard for the patentability of an invention, they
adopted the "inventive height" standard, a German version of non-
obviousness, as the primary standard for patentability. 92 In fact,
the inventive height standard was imported from American courts
by one German scholar.93 Under the current EPC inventive step
standard and the American nonobviousness standard, the advance
test is employed only if the difference is minor and is not obvious to
one skilled in the art. However, the advance test that German
courts found ineffective is still used by Japanese courts as a subtest
89. REVISE & CAESER, PATENTABILITY 148 (1936), cited in PATENTS supra note
1, § 5.04[5].
90. E.g., Atomeru Corp., 244 Tokkyo to Kigyo 33; see generally TAKEDA, TOKKYO
SHINKETU TORIKESHI SOSHO TONO JITSUMU (PRACTICE IN TRIAL AGAINST THE Ex-
AMINER'S DECISION Or REFUSAL) 168-69 (1988) [hereinafter PRACTICE IN TRIAL]
(Even though courts formally recognize a structural difference between an invention
and prior art, the inventions may be considered identical if the difference in effect and
operation of the inventions are insignificant).
91. See generally ULLRICH, supra note 32.
92. Id. at 25, 26.
93. Wirth, Das MaB der Erfindungshdhe, 1906 G.R.U.R. 57; see also Wirth, Die
Ntitzlichkeit der Erfindung, 1905 MITrEILUNGEN DER DEUTSHEN PATENTANWALTE
93 (1905); Takanaka, supra note 36.
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for the novelty standard.94
In the Japanese system, where structural and operational dif-
ferences between a claimed invention and prior art are minor, they
are examined under the novelty standard - i.e., the substantial
identity rule. Such minor structural differences are considered in-
significant enough to ignore in determining whether two inventions
are identical. In other words, a finding that two inventions are not
substantially the same - i.e., a finding that they satisfy the Japa-
nese novelty standard - sometimes entails a determination that the
difference between the inventions is nonobvious to one skilled in the
art - i.e., the difference satisfies the United States nonobviousness
or the EPC inventive step requirement. Thus, Japan's inventive
step standard, if it is the same as that under U.S. law and the EPC,
is superfluous because the substantial identity test of the novelty
standard subsumes the nonobviousness requirements.
When the nonobviousness standard was introduced in statu-
tory form, Professor Kitch predicted that courts would have to
adopt the single identity/source rule for the novelty standard;
otherwise the introduction of § 103 would be meaningless.95 The
plural tests of the substantial identity rule tend to develop their own
standards independent of the nonobviousness test.96 As long as the
substantial identity rule employs plural tests to examine the novelty
of an invention, its results will be unpredictable and variable. The
maintenance of plural tests only inhibits the development of an ob-
jective patent standard in the Japanese patent system.
Why did the Japanese system maintain the substantial identity
rule under the novelty standard after the inventive step standard
was introduced? To justify the presence of the rule, it is possible to
view Japanese law as using two kinds of standards. That is, under
the novelty standard the determination whether two inventions are
identical is made by the advance test, and the inventive step is de-
cided by the nonobviousness test. However, examples of inventions
which lack an inventive step under Japanese patent law show other-
94. See generally PATENTS, supra note 1; see also ULLRICH, supra note 32.
95. Kitch, supra note 27, at 327. Professor Kitch made the following observation:
[S]ome courts consider the inventive novelty test to derive from § 101
rather than § 103. The answer to this position must be that in a statute
that contains § 103, "new" in § 101 should be interpreted as it was in
Earle v. Sawyer [54 Fed. Cas. 254 (no. 4,247)(C.C.D. Mass. 1825)]. The
whole metaphysical apparatus that developed to distinguish the new from
the trivially new would never have been necessary in a statute that con-
tained a non-obviousness test. Now that the statute does contain such a
test, the apparatus can be dispensed with and new can once again be in-
terpreted as meaning new. The only good reason for inserting § 103 in
the statute was to choose one of the three competing tests of invention. If
tests implicitly rejected by § 103 are to reappear in § 101, these statutory
changes will prove fruitless.
96. PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.04[5], at 2-280.
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wise. The guidelines list examples of inventions which lack the in-
ventive step: (1) an invention which is a mere aggregation of old
inventions, and which does not provide a significant advantage by
the combination of the old inventions; (2) an invention involving the
transfer of prior art in one area to another area without providing
any significant advantage; (3) an invention involving the replace-
ment of one element of a prior art invention with another publicly
known element without providing any significant advantage by the
replacement; (4) an invention involving the new use of a prior art
device without providing any significant advantage by the new use;
(5) an invention involving remodeling and rearrangement of prior
art structure which does not provide any significant advantage over
the prior art; (6) an invention involving value limitation of prior art
invention which does not provide any significant advantage by the
limitation.97
As is apparent from the examples, since the significant advan-
tage provided by the modification is an important factor in meeting
the inventive step standard, the inventive step standard employs not
only the nonobviousness test but also the advance test. In other
words, these examples suggest that the structural difference between
the invention in question and a prior art invention is considered to
be significant and not readily conceived by one skilled in the art
whenever a significant advantage is provided by the difference.
Thus, analysis under the Japanese inventive step standard depends
heavily on the advance test. Inventions which are considered sub-
stantially identical are barely distinguishable from inventions that
lack the inventive step.
However, the theory that the nonobviousness of a structural
improvement should be evaluated by the advantage provided by the
improvement is unsound. Advances are made in many ways by in-
ventions of varying usefulness as well as by the development of im-
portant technological know-how or by intelligent engineering and
construction. The technological value of these inventions justifies a
patent monopoly in some cases, but not in others.
Thus, an objective standard to measure the value of an inven-
tion is needed. The only method available for testing the value is to
insert a minimum requirement into the advance test.98 Otherwise,
every trivial modification would be patentable as long as the modifi-
cation resulted in something new.
Japanese court decisions also show that there is no clear dis-
tinction between the Japanese novelty standard and the inventive
97. YOSHIMINE, supra note 78; JPO GUIDELINES, supra note 78.
98. See ULLRICH, supra note 32, at 97. In the conclusion of his comparative stud-
ies of American and German histories of standards of patentability, Professor Ullrich
pointed out the ineffectiveness of the advance test as a primary standard of patentability.
[Vol. 9:220
SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY RULE
step standard. The Tokyo High Court often reverses the Patent Of-
fice's rejections of claims, stating that the rejected modification is
not a simple replacement of one element of an invention with a
commonly-used means as long as the modification results in a sig-
nificant advantage.99 Japanese practitioners are aware that courts
tend to find a significant difference between two inventions when-
ever the difference results in a significant advantage over a prior art
invention.lcoo This was the inventive novelty doctrine established by
Japanese courts before the introduction of article 29, paragraph
2.101 Nonetheless, the Japanese courts did not use the language of
the nonobviousness test in article 29, paragraph 2, which sets forth
the inventive step standard, when examining the difference between
a claimed invention and prior art under the novelty standard. In-
stead of concluding that the modification would have been obvious
to one skilled in the art, the courts began to reject modifications for
lack of novelty, on the ground that they were "workmanship modi-
fication" or "commonly used art or means." The courts have con-
tinued to use the same old standard which is a mixture of the
novelty requirement and the inventive step requirement.
In In re F Hoffmann LaRoche und Aktiengesellschaft,10 2 the
applicant argued that the patent office erred in rejecting its applica-
tion because the patent office cited another prior art reference which
was allegedly technical common sense. The patent office's argu-
ment was that the missing element of the invention was old and well
known, and thus it was too easy to add the element: because the
difference was so insignificant the two inventions could be consid-
ered substantially identical. The patent office considered that the
invention had been disclosed in a single prior art in which only the
insignificant element was missing.
The Hoffmann court upheld the substantial identity rule ap-
plied in this way, stating that an invention disclosed in a prior art
99. Judgment of June 30, 1986, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 60 Gyo
Ke 162 (unpublished case).
100. Tokkyo iinkai, Tokkyoho Dai 29 Jo no 2 ni kansuru Hanketsurei no Kento (Dis-
cussion on Decisions regarding the Patent Law, Art. 29, Para. 2), 37 TOKKYO KANRI
981, 983 (1987) (analyzes above unpublished case).
101. E.g., Judgment of May 21, Daishin'in (Great Court of Judicature), Japan, 20
Horitsu Gakusetsu Hanrei Hyoron Zenshu, Shoho 615 (court upheld the patentability
of invention using the advance test to find that the improvement of the invention was
not obvious to those skilled in the art. The particular words of the court were:
Accordingly, the industrial advantage obtained by the claimed invention
and that of the prior art invention are different. Thus, the claimed inven-
tion should not be considered one which could have been conceived with-
out using any inventive genius, and thus easily conceived by a person
skilled in the art. In conclusion, the claimed invention cannot be antici-
pated by the existence of the prior art... ).
102. Judgment of Sept. 20, 1986, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 215 Tok-
kyo to Kigyo 72.
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publication should be read with the technical common sense of one
skilled in the art. The court reasoned that it is impossible to dis-
close every embodiment of an invention in an application. Thus,
the court concluded that it is reasonable to compare one invention
with another while making reference to the technical common sense
for one skilled in the art. Although the court's reasoning itself
sounds persuasive, it renders the inventive standard and the novelty
standard indistinguishable.
Commentators have tried to distinguish these standards.10 3
Judge Takeda, a Tokyo High Court judge who often overturned the
Patent Office's decisions, stated that a difference between two inven-
tions must be examined under the inventive step standard if the dif-
ference was made by replacing a well-known means or art with an
element of prior art, whereas a difference must be examined under
the novelty standard if the difference was made by replacing a com-
monly-used means with an element of prior art.1 04 He defined
"well-known means" as the means that everyone skilled in the art
knows very well, or the means well known in the art;10 5 "com-
monly-used means" as the means that everyone skilled in the art
knows very well and which is commonly used by everyone skilled in
the art. ° 6
The definitions of these terms are clear to only to Judge
Takeda: it is practically impossible to distinguish whether art falls
under the "commonly used means" or under the "well-known
means." The Japanese courts themselves have been confused by
these unclear definitions and the close relationship between the in-
ventive step and novelty standards. In In re Yokokawa Hokushin
Denki Seisakusho,0 7 the court used the phrase "well-known or
commonly used means" as well as the phrase "technical means
which are commonly used" at the same time, and upheld the PTO's
rejection of an application based on lack of inventive step. Judge
Takeda, in his book, concluded that the determination should be
based on the technical quality of the difference in two inventions.
Judge Takeda did not mention what sort of measure should be used,
which suggests judges can choose their own measure. The most im-
portant aim of a patent system is to provide an objective standard to
evaluate the technical quality of inventions. 108 If judges can choose
103. Eg., Inoue, Sekkei Henko no nintei (Finding of Workshop Modification), Bes-
satsu Jurist 37.
104. Takeda, supra note 77, at 1475.
105. Judgment of July 30, 1975, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 1975
Torikeshishu 73.
106. Kogyo Shoyuken Yogo Jiten Henshu Iinkai, KoGYO SHOYUKEN YOGO JrrEN
(THE DICTIONARY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TERMS).
107. Judgment of Oct. 18, 1984, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 1984
Torikeshishu 718.
108. Takeda, supra note 77, at 1476.
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their own measure, an applicant has no way to predict the patenta-
bility of an invention.
Japanese courts, in assessing claims under the novelty stan-
dard, have used the term "state of the art" in their opinions, 109 but
this has nothing to do with novelty. It refers to the level of technol-
ogy in an art when applying the nonobviousness or inventive step
standard. Courts also use the phrase "technical common sense" to
discuss novelty. Courts have not interpreted the phrase "technical
common sense" consistently. Some courts use the term to indicate
means or art which is well-known to everyone skilled in the art. 110
Other courts use the same term to indicate means or art which is
well-known to people who have no skill in the art.1I The substan-
tial identity rule is unclear and its result uncertain, because what
constitutes a simple modification varies from court to court.
B. New Utility - Example 3(b)
For a product claim, the difference between two inventions
must be examined not only in terms of structure or methodology,
but also in terms of functions and advantages (comparative util-
ity).11 2 "New utility" refers to the features and advantages of the
product of the prior art that were not disclosed in the prior art. An
inventor does not need to know why his invention works, or explain
all the uses of his invention; it is accepted that an invention claiming
a new use and advantage is patentable.
Under Japanese patent law, a so-called "mere new use" of an
old invention is considered identical to the old invention and thus
relates to the novelty standard. However, under American patent
law, a new use is also evaluated by the nonobviousness standard. 13
109. Eg., Judgment of Sept. 29, 1986, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 215
Tokkyo to Kigyo.
110. E.g., Judgment of Nov. 29, 1989, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan,
1982 Torikeshishu 747.
111. Eg., Judgment of Jan. 29, 1987, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan, 220
Tokkyo to Kigyo 46.
112. PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.03[5]; Chisum, "Afterthoughts" and Undisclosed
Advantages as Evidence of Patentability From Salt Dredges to Polystyrenes, 57 J.P.O.S.
438 (1975).
113. PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.03[5], at 5-190 to 5-191 (Professor Chisum explains
the theory behind examining comparative utility as evidence of nonobviousness as
follows:
The theory behind the use of comparative utility is one of inference based
on motivation. If an invention is advantageous but obvious, it is likely
that persons skilled in the art would have been led by normal economic
incentives to develop it sooner. Contrariwise, if the invention was no
more advantageous than existing products, or processes, a reasonable ex-
planation exists for its dormancy even though it was obvious. Naturally,
this inference based on motivation is subject to rebuttal. For example,
the invention may have become advantageous only shortly before the in-
vention due to collateral changes in technology or consumer demand.)
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The JPO guidelines explain that a new use is a "mere new use"
and therefore unpatentable if: 1) the new use is obvious from the
other features of the invention, or 2) the inventor limited the claim
to the new use of the prior art." 4 American courts examine the
new use with respect to the motive of the inventor of the new use."5
Similarly, when evaluating whether a new use is patentable, Japa-
nese courts inquire into the inventor's motive to determine whether
a claim including a limitation of new use is a patentable new use or
a mere new use. The JPO guidelines explain that to find two inven-
tions identical, the new use of an invention should be obvious from
the structure and advantage of the prior invention." 1 6 This explana-
tion clearly shows that the determination of substantial identity re-
garding mere new use entails the nonobviousness test. In other
words, JPO uses an evaluation similar to the one that Professor
Chisum explained regarding the nonobviousness standard." 7 It is
questionable whether there exists a patentable invention which is
not a mere new use, but lacks an inventive step. Thus, so long as
the substantial identity rule is used to determine novelty, the inven-
tive step analysis does not help determine the patentability of a new
use invention.
C. Obvious or Useless Limitation - Example 3 (c)
It is unclear from the JPO guidelines which limitations are ob-
vious and useless, and which can be distinguished from the inven-
tions listed in 3(l). The JPO guidelines state the following:
A. A cap for a fountain pen including slip stopping means on
the lower end of clip (1), said stopping means protruding in-
wardly and having a rough surface.
B. A cap for a fountain pen including slip stopping means on
the lower end of clip (1), said stopping means having a rough
surface.
The limitation underlined is obvious to one skilled in the art.
Even without the explicit limitation, one skilled in the art naturally
thinks that the stopping means protrudes inwardly. If there is a
drawing of the fountain pen attached to the specifications, claim B
is readily understood to include the limitation. Thus, these types of
inventions are considered identical even under the strict single
source/identity rule of American patent law and the EPC.
D. Species Invention - Example 3(d)
The question whether a prior genus invention anticipates a
114. JPO GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at [1]-14-8.
115. See Professor Chisum's comment, supra note 113.
116. YOSHIMINE, supra note 78, at 127.
117. See Professor Chisum's comment, supra note 113.
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later species invention is complicated." 8  It is well-settled that a
valid patent may issue for a nonobvious improvement, even though
the improvement falls within the claims of the prior patent." 19 For
such improvements, under Japanese patent law, article 72 provides
a definition of improvement which utilizes the concept of prior pat-
ent.' 20 Under the strict standard of United States patent law, a ge-
nus invention of prior art which does not explicitly disclose a
species does not anticipate the later species invention.1 21 However,
later species are compared with the prior genus for the purpose of
the nonobviousness standard. 122
Under the Japanese novelty standard, the genus invention an-
ticipates a later species invention if the invention is considered a
species of the prior genus based on the state of the art at the filing
date of the later species invention. 123 If the species is obvious to one
skilled in the art even though the species is not explicitly disclosed
in the genus prior art, the invention is considered a species of the
prior art. Thus, this examination is precisely the determination of
the inventive step, because it determines whether the species could
have been readily conceived by those skilled in the art. The guide-
lines apparently use the term "obvious" to indicate the substantial
identity rule so that it is distinguished from the phrase "invention
which could have been easily conceived," which indicates the inven-
tive step. However, the meanings of these terms are essentially the
same. Accordingly, with respect to species inventions, the substan-
tial identity rule of the novelty standard and the inventive step stan-
dard are indistinguishable. It is meaningless to examine the
nonobviousness of an invention under both the novelty standard
and the inventive step standard. Species inventions should be ex-
amined only under the inventive step standard.
E. Later Invention Which Has One Element Identical to an
Alternative Element in a Prior Invention - Example 4
One example of an alternative limitation is where one element
of a prior invention is described as rubber or plastic, and one ele-
ment of a later invention is described only as rubber. If there is no
significant difference between the two inventions, this example falls
118. A genus invention is an invention relating to a general concept such as a class
of chemical compounds, and a species invention is an invention relating to a more par-
ticular concept such as one of the chemical compounds.
119. PATENTS, supra note 1, § 3.02[2], at 3-19 to 3-20.
120. See generally NAKAYAMA, CHuKAI TOKKYOHO (DETAILED EXPLANATION OF
THE PATENT LAW) 565 (1983).
121. E.g., Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993 (1988).
122. Eg., Gardner v. TEC Sys., Inc., 725 F.2d 1338 (1984); see generally PATENTS,
supra note 1, §§ 5.03[5][a], 5.04[6][e], 5.06[l].
123. JPO GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at [1]-14-9.
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under item 4 of the guideline. These two inventions can be consid-
ered a species invention of another invention. Therefore, the prob-
lem with this type of invention corresponds to the problems with
genus and species inventions.
F. Combination of Old Inventions - Example 5
According to the JPO guidelines, an invention which is a com-
bination of an old and a new invention is properly rejected when the
prior invention that is added to the later invention is well-known, 124
and where the addition does not result in any significant advan-
tage. 25 This type of invention corresponds either to one of
Walker's negative rules to produce an "aggregation,"'' 26 or to the
requirement that a combination of old elements produces a signifi-
cant advance. 127 Although this example is limited to inventions
which are combinations of an old invention and a well-known in-
vention, it is difficult to decide whether an invention is well-known
or not. The guidelines state that an invention which was disclosed
in only one publication may not be considered well-known. How-
ever, how many publications are sufficient to make an invention
well-known? As long as there is no clear rule, this determination is
inevitably subjective.
Under United States patent law, the combination of old inven-
tions has been examined under the nonobviousness standard of
§ 103, since this section's introduction. With respect to combina-
tion inventions, the advance test and the new result test' 28 both sur-
vived even after the introduction of § 103.129 However, a different
standard should not be used for combination inventions than for
other inventions. The proper test for combination inventions
should relate to the determination whether the combination is non-
obvious from the combined elements, even where the elements are
old.' 30
Under the guidelines, this type of combination of old inven-
tions is considered identical if there is no significant technical ad-
vance resulting from the combination. 131 In practice, the existence
of a significant technical advance is mainly determined by the exist-
ence of a new result. In other words, the Japanese patent office and
124. All inventions listed in the Patent Code, art. 29, para. 1 do not constitute well-
known inventions.
125. JPO GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at [1]-14-9.
126. See supra note 84 (negative rules).
127. PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.04[5][b], at 2-282.
128. The test that Professor Ullrich called "the advance in the art test" is called "the
new result test" by Professor Chisum. PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.04[b][c], at 2-282.
129. See generally PATENTS, supra note 1, at § 5.04(5).
130. Id., § 5.04[5][c].
131. JPO GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at [11-14-20.
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courts are still applying the advance test to check the substantial
identity of a combination invention. Since the advance test survived
even in American courts, it is not surprising that Japanese courts
continue to use the advance test for combination inventions.
Further, it appears that this kind of examination is also con-
ducted to determine whether the combination invention satisfies the
inventive step. 132 Thus, with respect to combination inventions as
well, there is no distinction between the standards of novelty and
inventive step in that both standards are met based on the advan-
tage obtained by the combination.
V. Proposal
Inventions which have been deemed substantially identical to a
prior art invention under the Japanese novelty standard are in fact
those which should have been evaluated under the inventive step
standard. In fact, as long as the prior art was published before the
filing date of the later invention, the Japanese Patent Office will re-
ject the later invention on the ground of lack of inventive step. 133
Under the substantial identity rule of the novelty standard, applica-
tions which involve minor modifications are rejected only where
prior art is a co-pending, unpublished application.134
The Japanese patent office and courts have not abandoned the
substantial identity rule because they do not want to grant a patent
for a trivial modification which was obvious from a prior art inven-
tion disclosed in a co-pending application unpublished at the filing
date. As explained above, the language in art. 29 bis does not per-
mit examiners to reject an invention when the invention is not
prima facie identical to a prior art invention disclosed in a co-pend-
ing, unpublished application. However, in practice the Japanese
patent office and courts have struck down such inventions using the
substantial identity rule.
Thus, like American patent law, in Japanese practice, prior art
inventions in an unpublished co-pending application are considered
under the novelty standard as well as the inventive step standard.
For instance, it is not clear which Japanese patent office practice
Fusion Systems Corporation opposes. 135 American industry can
make a strong argument that trivial modifications made in the pe-
132. See Takenaka, supra note 36 (an invention is considered a mere aggregation if
there is no unexpected result caused by the combination of old elements).
133. Takeda, supra note 77, at 1081, table 3-1.
134. PATENT CODE, supra note 3, art. 29. As with the EPC, Japanese patent law
allows use of the content of copending unpublished application only for the purpose of
novelty, but not for inventive step. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1988).
135. See supra note 5. Mr. Spero, in his article, did not specify which practice, such
as novelty or inventive step standards, or the granting of utility model registration, al-
lows grant of patents for trivial modifications.
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riod between the filing date and the date of laying open for publica-
tion can be patented under Japanese patent law, and such a practice
makes the Japanese patentability standard lower than the American
standard. However, this argument fails to give due consideration to
the substantial identity rule in practice. Contrary to the view of
Fusion Systems Corporation,' 3 6 the Japanese Patent Office has read
well-known information into single prior art to strike down minor
modifications under the substantial identity rule.
On the other hand, in determining whether an invention meets
the novelty and inventive step requirements, the Japanese patent of-
fice and courts tend to pay undue attention to the advantage of the
invention compared with a prior art invention. Even when evaluat-
ing a structural difference between two inventions, they find both
novelty and inventive step whenever the invention provides a signifi-
cant advantage over a single prior art. As explained above, a test
relying on the advance over prior art does not effectively sort out
valuable inventions from trivial modifications. Japanese patentabil-
ity requirements are rather easy to satisfy, because an invention is
patentable if an applicant shows a significant advantage over a prior
art invention even where there are no significant structural improve-
ments over prior art inventions. Thus, it may be true that the Japa-
nese Patent Office allows patents for minor structural modifications
which provides a significant advantage, and this results in a lower
patentability standard than the American standard. 37
The Japanese patent system should abandon the practice of us-
ing the nonobviousness test and advance test to decide the inventive
step of an invention. Without any objective measure to evaluate the
degree of advantage, an advance test cannot provide an objective
standard to determine the value of an invention. As long as the
Japanese patent system depends on the advance test to evaluate
novelty and inventive step, there will be uncertainty in the patenta-
bility of inventions.
The United States and European countries employ a single
source/identity rule under the novelty standard. They evaluate the
patentability of an invention under the nonobviousness or inventive
step standard if any element of an invention is missing from a single
prior art. The advance test is no longer a primary test for evaluat-
ing modifications over prior art in either Germany or the United
States. Thus, considering the ineffectiveness of the advance test, the
136. Id.
137. But see, PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.03[5]. Under American patent law the fact
that the claimed invention achieves superior results and advantages as compared to the
closest prior art product or process tends to show that it was not obvious. In particular,
to show the nonobviousness of improvement over its pioneer invention, it is common to
rely upon evidence of the results of tests which compare the improvement and pioneer
invention.
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Japanese patent system should cease using the advance test to con-
clude that a modification is nonobvious from prior art, or that a
modification is substantially identical to a prior art invention. As
discussed above, the substantial identity rule renders the inventive
step standard useless. Additionally, the practice of striking down
an invention on grounds of substantial identity with a prior art in-
vention presents several problems.
First, the substantial identity rule can be very disadvantageous
to patent applicants. In practice, the Japanese Patent Office may
decide that a difference is a simple modification of a basic prior ref-
erence without citing any prior art to show the "simplicity" of the
modification. 138 Without a prior art citation, it is difficult to argue
the nonobviousness of the modification by explaining the distant re-
lationship between the two prior art references. 139
Furthermore, even when prior art is cited to show that the
modification is obvious and does not require more than mere work-
man-like skill, it is not clear to whom the modification is obvious.
Some courts use the standpoint of one skilled in the art, while other
courts use that of ordinary people unskilled in the art.Y4° Further-
more, there is no objective standard to distinguish between "mere
prior art inventions" and "well-known inventions." Where an ap-
plication is rejected under the substantial identity standard, the is-
sue whether a modification is well-known art or commonly used art
often becomes the main source of contention. Without a clear stan-
dard, how can applicants convince a judge that the modification is
not a simple change of well-known art?14' In Japan, courts seldom
accept an affidavit from an expert witness to show that the modifica-
tion is not obvious. An expert opinion stating that the modification
138. Judgment of July 17, 1985, Tokyo Kosei (Tokyo High Court), Japan, Tokkyo
News 6679. See generally Aragaki, Shuchi Kanyo Gifustsu no Rissho (Proof of Well
Known Art and Commonly Used art), TOKKYO SOSHO NO SHOMONDAI 499.
139. See generally Tokkyo Iinkai, Tokkyo ho 29 Jo no 2 ni kansuru Unyono Jittai ni
tsuite (Survey of the Examination Practice Regarding Art. 29, Para. 2.), 32 TOKKYO
KANRI 93 (1982); Tokkyo iinkai, Tokkyoho 20jo no 2 ni kansuru hanketsurei no kento
(Analysis of Case Decisions Regarding Art. 29, Para 2.), 37 TOKKYO KANRI 981 (1987).
Tokkyo Iinkai pointed out the difficulty of overcoming a rejection based on the substan-
tial identity of the novelty standard. They recommend that an applicant request cita-
tions when an examiner rejects an application without citing any documents to show
that the difference is a simple modification.
140. See supra notes 110 and 111; see also, PRACTICE IN TRIAL, supra note 90, at
152.
141. See generally, Takeda, supra note 77, at 1477. Judge Takeda thinks that judges
can decide whether a difference in two inventions is a simple modification without any
expert witness. See also Aragaki, Shuchi kanyo gijutsu no risho (The Proof of Well
Known or Commonly Used Means), TOKKYO SOSHO NO SHOMONDAI 499; Honma,
Sosho ni okeru Keikensoku no Kino (The Function of Experience Rule in Suit), 5 KozA
MINJI SHOSHO 80.
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is not obvious does not persuade Japanese examiners and judges of
the nonobviousness of an invention.
The unclear boundary between the novelty standard and the
inventive step standard provides another reason that the Japanese
patent system should discard the substantial identity rule. Under
American law, the burden of proof for the Patent & Trademark
Office (PTO) under the novelty standard is different from that
under the nonobviousness standard. Under the novelty standard,
the PTO has to show that every element of the claimed invention is
disclosed in a single prior art. In contrast, under the nonobvious-
ness standard, the PTO must produce factual evidence indicating
the prima facie obviousness of the claimed invention.1 42 The evi-
dence needed to establish prima facie obviousness is illustrated by
In re Linter:143
In determining the propriety of the Patent Office case for obvi-
ousness in the first instance, it is necessary to ascertain whether
or not the reference teachings would appear to be sufficient for
one of ordinary skill in the relevant art having the reference
before him to make the proposed substitution, combination or
other modification.
In Graham v. Deere,'" the U.S. Supreme Court listed four fac-
tual inquiries a court should make in determining nonobviousness:
(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention
and the prior art; and (4) so-called "secondary" considerations.
Both structural and operational differences should be evaluated. 45
The relationship of prior art references to the claimed invention is
evaluated with respect to the doctrine of analogous and nonana-
logous art.'"
Thus, American examiners' burden of proof for showing non-
obviousness is much heavier than that for showing lack of novelty.
As a result, American examiners tend to reject a claimed invention
on the ground of lack of novelty rather than nonobviousness if the
difference between a claimed invention and prior art is minor. 147 In
contrast, since Japanese examiners are not constrained by such a
distinction in the burden of proof, they prefer to reject an invention
142. PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.06[1], at 5-438 to 5-439.
143. 458 F.2d 1013, 173 U.S.P Q. 560 (1972).
144. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965).
145. Eg., In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 1344 n.6, 166 U.S.P.Q. 406, 409, n.6 (CCPA
1970).
146. See generally PATENTS, supra note 1, § 5.03[1][a], at 5-73 to 5-99.
147. Kitch, supra note 27, at 345. Professor Kitch stated, "A rejection for lack of
novelty is relatively stable ground. If something is not new, it is hard for the applicant
to argue that it is. But a rejection on grounds of nonobviousness is shakier because it
may involve differences in judgment between the examiner and the review board."
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based on the lack of inventive step as long as the prior art was pub-
lished before the filing date of the invention.
The theory underlying the practice requiring examiners to
show prima facie nonobviousness also can be found in the history of
the German patent system. Wirth, who introduced the nonobvious-
ness standard into the German patent system, put forth the idea
that once an invention is shown to be novel, the challenger, not the
applicant or patentee, must show that the new invention fails to
satisfy the nonobviousness standard.148
Patent law separated the standards of novelty and inventive
step to properly distribute the burden of proof and to provide appli-
cants with the means to deal with the somewhat subjective standard
of inventive step or nonobviousness. Otherwise, there would be no
necessity for two separate standards. 149 One standard, the inventive
step, could be used to reject all inventions which do not deserve a
monopoly patent, as is done currently in the Japanese Patent Office.
Therefore, the substantial identity rule, which exists between
the inventive step and novelty standard, should be removed, and
Japanese examiners should be more sensitive to the distinction be-
tween the two standards. An examiner should be made aware that
if he recognizes any difference between the claimed invention and
any single prior art reference, he bears a heavier burden of proof to
show lack of inventive step than he would to show lack of novelty.
One last reason remains for removing the substantial identity
rule. Identity of invention is one of the most basic concepts in the
Japanese patent system. One of the most important issues regard-
ing not only the novelty standard, but also the scope of permissible
amendments and the interpretation of the scope of a patent, is the
determination whether one invention is identical to a prior art in-
vention, to an amended invention, or to an invention underlying an
accused device or process.' 50 However, the scope of permissible
amendments and the scope of claim interpretation seem much
smaller than the scope of the substantial identity rule under the
novelty standard. As such, there is an internal inconsistency in the
concept of invention identity in the Japanese patent system.15 1 The
concept of invention identity, however, should be consistent; remov-
148. ULLRICH, supra note 32, at 32-33.
149. In American practice, the "new use" doctrine, or something old but used for a
purpose entirely unrelated to its old use, may be exceptions. A product or process claim
can be anticipated even if it is decided to be nonobvious. See generally PATENTS, supra
note 1, § 3.02[3]. In Japanese practice, the new use is discussed with respect to inven-
tive step, rather than novelty. As long as there is an unexpected advantage, an inven-
tion may be patentable.
150. Hayashi, Hatsumei no Doitsusei o megutte (Comment on the Substantial Iden-
tity of invention), 38 TOKKYO KANRI (PATENT MANAGEMENT) 931 (1988).
151. Umase, Tokkyo ni okeru Gainen to Sotaisei (Relativity of Concepts Under Patent
Law), MUTAIZAISANKENHO NO SHOMONDAI 59 (1980).
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ing the substantial identity rule would remedy this problem. 152
Patent infringement involves interpretation of the claim and
determination whether the claim so construed reads on the accused
device or process. 153 To find infringement, American courts ex-
amine whether the literal meaning of the claim covers the accused
device and further examine whether the claim covers the accused
device under the doctrine of equivalents. 54 Under American law,
there is a rule which holds, "that which should literally infringe if
later in time anticipates if earlier than the date of invention." 155
Thus, the test for novelty corresponds to the test for literal infringe-
ment. The test under the doctrine of equivalents, which expands
the literal scope of a patent, is similar but not identical to the test
for nonobviousness. 156 In short, American courts use a test similar
to the test for the novelty standard to find literal infringement, and
a test similar to the test for the nonobviousness standard to find
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
In contrast, Japanese courts use the test for finding infringe-
ment inconsistently. Japanese courts traditionally compare the con-
cept of the invention, which is construed from the claim, and the
concept underlying the accused device or process. Since the con-
cept, rather than the limitation in a claim, is compared to the ac-
cused device or process, minor modifications should be included in
the scope of the patented invention. As infringement inquires
whether two inventions are identical, a test similar to the substantial
identity rule is used to decide infringement. If Japanese courts use
the substantial identity rule, they need not use the doctrine of
equivalents. Thus, some courts find infringement, stating that a
claimed invention and the concept underlying an accused device are
substantially identical even where there are minor modifications,
without using the word "equivalents."
Furthermore, one might assume that Japanese courts employ
the same two-step interpretation as American courts: the substan-
tial identity test to find literal infringement, and the test for inven-
tive step standard to find infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. This is not the case, however. Some courts find in-
fringement without using the substantial identity rule, stating that a
claimed invention and a technical idea underlying an accused device
152. MATSUMOTO, TOKKYO HATSUMEI NO HOGOHANI (THE SCOPE OF PROTEC-
TION FOR PATENTED INVENTIONS) (1981).
153. See generally PATENTS, supra note 1, § 18.01, at 18-2.
154. Id. § 18.04, at 18-67 (The doctrine of equivalents prevents a person from prac-
ticing a fraud on a patent by substituting obvious equivalents for elements in the claims
in order to avoid their literal language).
155. Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766,
1768 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see generally PATENTS, supra note 1, at 3.02[1], 3-14.
156. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
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are different but deemed equivalents. Therefore, Japanese courts
and scholars are confused as to whether the doctrine of equivalents
relates to the identity of invention or to the similarity of two differ-
ent inventions.1 57
To resolve this confusion, the substantial identity rule must be
completely removed from the Japanese patent system. The rules
established by the Japanese courts which relate to the evaluation of
two different inventions, such as workmanship modification, the ad-
dition of a useless step to avoid infringement (ukai hoho), and the
exchange of equivalents, should be reorganized under the doctrine
of equivalents. Because Japanese courts tend to handle problems
under the invention identity rule which should be decided under the
doctrine of equivalents, American attorneys tend to be misled into
thinking that Japanese courts interpret claims too narrowly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The substantial identity rule provides unique character to the
novelty standard in the Japanese patent system. Unfortunately, this
unique rule niakes the Japanese novelty standard and inventive step
standard inseparable as well as unpredictable. To clarify the confu-
sion between the two standards, as well as to set up an objective
standard for Japanese patentability, the substantial identity rule
must be completely removed from the Japanese patent system. In
particular, from the time the inventive step standard was statutorily
introduced, the substantial identity rule has been nothing more than
a useless vestige of the historical influence of American and German
courts. The Japanese patent system should have abandoned the
substantial identity rule long ago.
157. See generally UCHIDA, supra note 38, at 100 et seq.
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